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Abstract
Because optimal plans are time-inconsistent, continuing one from a
previous period is not optimal from today’s perspective, and may not out-
perform discretion, even ignoring gains from surprise deviations. Hence,
contrary to conventional wisdom, a binding and credible commitment does
not always outperform discretion over time, even if a non-credible com-
mitment does. Forward-looking policymakers might therefore not want
to irrevocably bind themselves to the optimal plan from any particular
period, even if they could. The vast literature proposing different com-
mitment mechanisms illustrates that it is a common misconception that a
credible commitment to the optimal plan is always preferable to discretion.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Kydland and Prescott (1977) showing that the
optimal commitment plan is time-inconsistent (see also Calvo (1978) and Barro
and Gordon (1983a)), so that policymakers have incentives to deviate in any
later period to commit to the new optimal plan, much effort has gone into ex-
ploring ways for policymakers to overcome these incentives, thus enabling them
to credibly commit. For example, policymakers might be able to bind them-
selves to follow the original optimal plan by staking their reputation on it (Barro
and Gordon (1983b) and Rogoff (1987)), by delegating its implementation (Pers-
son and Tabellini (1993), Rogoff (1985), Svensson (1997) and Walsh (1995)),
or by making it too time-consuming, or costly, to change course (Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Kotlikoff, Persson and Svensson (1988)).1 However, these
commitment mechanisms implicitly assume that continuing the original optimal
plan will achieve policymakers’ objectives to a greater extent than discretion also
from the perspective of later periods, making such a commitment desirable also
in the future. We show that this is not always the case.
Because optimal plans are time-inconsistent, continuing the one from a pre-
vious period is not optimal, and as we show, can even do worse than discretion.
Moreover, we show that this is feasible for extremely patient policymakers with
arbitrarily low discount rates, or even completely ignoring any potential gains
from an unanticipated deviation to discretion. Hence, our point is not that the
1The literature on sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Stokey (1991)) considers
situations where policymakers cannot commit, deciding instead policy sequentially one period
at a time. However, contrary to standard discretion, it assumes policymakers take into account
how their actions affect the publics’ behavior, and exploit this influence by employing trigger
strategies contingent on past actions.
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superiority of commitment over discretion might be insufficient to discourage a
deviation to discretion, and the potential gains from a surprise deviation, but
rather that, from the perspective of future periods, the original optimal commit-
ment plan might simply not be superior to discretion.2 Consequently, forward-
looking policymakers might not want to bind themselves to the optimal plan
from a particular period, even if they could. Our results are relevant in many
policy situations, but especially for monetary policy, where commitment solu-
tions are commonly utilized in normative studies, and sometimes even to guide
actual policy (Dennis (2010)), taking for granted that a binding once-and-for-all
commitment will perform better over time than discretion.
As an example, imagine that the optimal discretionary policy is never to pun-
ish for misbehavior, while the optimal commitment plan calls for punishing future
misbehavior, so as to discourage it, but not to punish current misbehavior (which
has already taken place, and can therefore not be discouraged). We show that
while always threatening to punish for future misbehavior, but never actually do-
ing so, does better than a policy of never punishing, as long as the threat remains
credible, always punishing for misbehavior might not do better than never pun-
ishing. In other words, while commitment is always superior to discretion, since
it presumes the benefit of better behavior induced by the threat of punishment
without ever actually incurring the cost of carrying it out, a binding, and thus
credible, commitment, which does require carrying out the punishment to yield
better behavior, might not be superior to discretion. Hence, following through
on rules designed so as to shape expectations of future policy, and thus influence
2Our study is limited to situations where commitment is superior to discretion, as in the
tradition of Kydland and Prescott (1977).
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individuals’ behavior, does not always outperform discretionary policymaking.
In most decision problems, an individual’s optimal present behavior depends
on her expectations about the future, including future policy. As a result, most
policy problems are dynamic, in that the current outcome does not only depend
on the currently implemented policy, but also on that expected to be imple-
mented in the future. The optimal commitment solution exploits these dynamics
by committing to a plan of action for all future periods, chosen so as to shape
expectations optimally from the perspective of the time at which it is designed.
Consequently, from the viewpoint of this original period, it achieves policymak-
ers’ objectives to a greater extent than the optimal discretionary policy, which
does not attempt to influence expectations. However, from the perspective of any
later period, the optimal plan differs, that is, the plan is unchanged in that the
prescribed action to implement x periods later remains the same, but the action
to implement in a particular period can vary across optimal plans from different
times. Specifically, when the time comes to enforce a previously promised action
designed to influence expectations prior to its implementation, it has already
played its role in terms of shaping these expectations, making it preferable, from
the perspective of the current point in time, to implement the optimal discre-
tionary action. This is why policymakers have incentives to deviate from the op-
timal plan from any previous period, and thus the source of its time-inconsistency.
Policymakers would achieve their objectives to the greatest extent possible
if in every period they could credibly commit to the optimal plan from the
perspective of that period. But, this would, due to time-inconsistency, require
reneging on past commitments in every period, so that these cannot be credible.
Ruling out the possibility of systematically misleading the public, the literature
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has focused on finding ways for policymakers to credibly bind themselves to the
original optimal plan. The idea is that policymakers should ignore the urge to
reoptimize, since credibly recommitting to a new plan in every period is not fea-
sible, and instead remain faithful to the original optimal plan, thus avoiding the
discretionary equilibrium (McCallum (1995), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and
Woodford (1999)). However, while the original plan is preferable to discretion
from the viewpoint of the original starting point, this might not be the case from
the perspective of later periods. If the outdated optimal plan eventually does
worse than the discretionary equilibrium, how can the original commitment to
follow this plan in all future periods be credible? Since bygones are bygones,
the fact that the original plan did better initially is irrelevant, and policymakers
would prefer to divert to the discretionary equilibrium. If, instead, the original
plan does better over time than discretion, the implicit threat of diverting to the
less desirable discretionary equilibrium can motivate policymakers to overcome
the temptation to deviate.
We assume a strict trigger-strategy where the public comes to expect dis-
cretion in all periods following any deviation from a previous commitment, no
matter what policymakers say or do (Chari and Kehoe (1990)). Combined with
rational expectations, this implies that policymakers must choose between the
original optimal plan and the discretionary equilibrium, there is no other option.
Because credibly committing to a new plan in every period is not feasible, the fact
that doing so would yield better results than remaining faithful to the original
optimal plan is irrelevant. What matters then is whether a binding commitment
to the original plan yields better results over time than discretion, the only feasi-
ble alternative. It is unclear how realistic the assumption of such a strict trigger
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strategy of reverting to discretion forever is, or how the public would coordinate
on it. On one hand policymakers have incentives to mislead the public, as dis-
cussed above, by promising to follow the optimal plan in the future, but then
implementing the optimal discretionary policy. On the other hand, individuals
have incentives to forecast future policy as accurately as possible, assuming fore-
cast errors lead to suboptimal decisions. Hence, if policymakers were to return to
the old commitment plan after a deviation, it would be in individuals best interest
to adapt their expectations, if it enables them to forecast better. Of course, the
more severe and credible the punishment for deviating from past commitments
is, the more it deters these (al-Nowaihi and Levine (1994)).
Each of the three sections below studies a model where continuing the op-
timal plan from a previous period can lead to worse outcomes than discretion.
The first is a stylized model, which while not very realistic, provides the clearest
illustration. The second example is a standard new-Keynesian sticky-price model
of the inflation-output trade-off, commonly used to analyze and guide monetary
policy. The last example is a more general model, where the problem is attenu-
ated.3 The more distant the policy expectations affecting the current state, the
more prone the old optimal plan is to being outperformed by discretion.
3The models are borrowed from Jensen and McCallum (2010), who use these to compare
two different commitment strategies, timeless perspective and optimal continuation, both of
which differ from the optimal commitment plan. Another example, in a more complicated but
detailed setting, is that provided by Sleet and Yeltekin (2005). In a dynamic moral hazard
economy where a planner allocates goods among agents who have private information about
their heterogeneous evaluation of consumption, they find that “the optimal allocation with
commitment eventually violates the sustainability constraints and is never credible regardless
of the patience of the planner.” In these moral hazard models it is standard that the optimal
plan eventually leads to immiseration, that is, the worst possible feasible outcome (Green
(1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and Phelan (1998)). While
immiseration does not apply in general for dynamic models, the optimal plan can still do worse
than discretion over time, even without moral hazard and agent heterogeneity.
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2 Stylized model
Imagine a policy problem for which in any period t0 the objective is to minimize
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
pi2t + ωy
2
t
)
(1)
subject to
pit = β
JEtpit+J + αyt + ut (2)
for t = t0, t0 + 1, t0 + 2, . . . where β ∈ (0, 1), ω > 0, α > 0, and J is an integer
greater or equal to one. The constraint (2) links the policy instrument pit to the
endogenous variable yt, which also depends on the exogenous stochastic shock
ut and period-t expectations of the policy to be implemented J periods later,
Etpit+J .
Exploiting that certainty equivalence prevails in this linear-quadratic frame-
work (Currie and Levine (1993, pp. 95-121)), the optimal commitment policy
can be obtained by inserting the constraint (2) into the objective (1), ignoring
the expectations operator, and minimizing the resulting sum
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(
pi2t +
ω
α2
(
pit − βJpit+J − ut
)2)
(3)
with respect to the policy instrument {pit}∞t=t0 . The corresponding first-order
conditions yield
pit = −ω
α
yt (4)
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for t = t0, t0 + 1, t0 + 2, . . . , t0 + J − 1, and
pit = −ω
α
yt +
ω
α
yt−J (5)
for t = t0 + J, t0 + J + 1, t0 + J + 2, . . . , the optimal commitment plan from
the perspective of any period t0. This plan is time-inconsistent, because if the
policy problem were reconsidered in any later period t′0 > t0, the optimal plan
would differ, prescribing equation (4) in periods t′0, t
′
0 + 1, t
′
0 + 2, . . . , t
′
0 + J − 1
and equation (5) in t = t′0 + J, t
′
0 + J + 1, t
′
0 + J + 2, . . . , as this would minimize
Et′0
∞∑
t=t′0
βt−t
′
0
(
pi2t + ωy
2
t
)
, (6)
the period-t′0 policy objective. The optimal t
′
0-plan postpones the implementation
of equation (5) relative to the optimal plan from period t0. The reason is that
according to the constraint (2), only expectations of policy J periods into the
future matter for the current state, and when policymakers reoptimize at any
later time, J periods into the future gets pushed further ahead. When the policy
problem is reconsidered in every period, policymakers always implement equation
(4), which constitutes the optimal discretionary policy.
The value of the policy objective (1) in any period t0 depends not just on
the policy applied in t0, but also on that expected to be implemented in all
subsequent periods t0 + 1, t0 + 2, t0 + 3, . . . This is what the optimal commitment
solution exploits to outperform the discretionary one. Over time, the best possible
outcome for policymakers arises when they can commit in each period to the
optimal plan from the perspective of that period. This implies implementing
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equation (4) in every period, while simultaneously convincing people that they
will switch to equation (5) J periods later. Of course, continuously promising a
policy switch in the future that gets pushed off in the subsequent period, cannot
be credible. Sooner or later the public would realize that the switch will never
happen, and come to expect equation (4) to be implemented in all future periods.
As a result, we would go from the commitment solution to the discretionary one.
Ruling out the possibility of systematically misleading the public period after
period, focus has been on finding ways for policymakers to credibly commit to
the original optimal plan, thus avoiding the discretionary equilibrium. What we
ask is whether it is desirable to bind oneself to the original optimal plan, i.e., is it
superior to discretion over time? The discretionary solution matches the optimal
plan from the perspective of period t0 for t = t0, t0 + 1, t0 + 2, . . . , t0 + J − 1,
but deviates from it for t = t0 + J, t0 + J + 1, t0 + J + 2, . . . The optimal plan
from t0 − 1 matches that from t0 for all periods except t0 + J − 1. The optimal
plan from t0 − 2 matches that from t0 in all periods except t0 + J − 1 and
t0+J−2. Any optimal plan from t0−J or earlier deviates from the one from t0 for
t = t0, t0+1, t0+2, . . . t0+J−1, but matches it for t = t0+J, t0+J+1, t0+J+2, . . .
Hence, the old plan deviates more the more outdated it is, and the larger is J .
Given that a credible, once-and-for all, commitment would eventually require
implementing the optimal plan from more than J periods ago, how will that
compare with the optimal discretionary policy from the perspective of the policy
objective in that future period? Assuming that the plan originated in t0, and that
t′0 is any period such that t
′
0 ≥ t0 + J , continuing the original commitment plan
would require implementing equation (5) in all periods t′0, t
′
0 + 1, t
′
0 + 2, . . . that
are relevant for the period-t′0 policy objective (6). Consequently, its value will
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depend on the initial conditions yt′0−J , yt′0−J+1, yt′0−J+2, . . . , yt′0−1 and ut′0 , which
are unknown at time t0, and would vary with the choice of t
′
0.
4 Integrating the
policy objective (6) over all feasible initial conditions, yields
E
∞∑
t=t′0
βt−t
′
0
(
pi2t + ωy
2
t
)
, (7)
the unconditional loss function. While policymakers can use current conditions to
predict future initial conditions, looking far enough ahead, which is necessary due
to the once-and-for-all nature of the optimal commitment policy, these become
irrelevant, and the pertinent objective is the unconditional expected value of
the loss.5 Its value when continuing the optimal plan from period t0, enforcing
equation (5) in all periods t = t′0, t
′
0 + 1, t
′
0 + 2, . . . , is
Lc =
8ω3β2J
(
ωp− α2ρJ (α2 − r)) s
(ω (1 + βJ (1− 2ρJ)) + α2 + r)2 (2ωβJ − ρJ (ω (1 + βJ) + α2 − r)) q (8)
where
s =
σ2
(1− ρ2) (1− β) , (9)
p = 2ω
(
1− βJ) (1− ρJ)+ α2 (2 (1− βJ)− ρJ (βJ + 3))+ 2r (ρJ − 1) , (10)
q = ω
(
1 + βJ
) (
ω
(
1− βJ)+ 2α2 − r)+ α2 (α2 − r) , (11)
r =
√
ω2 (1− βJ)2 + α2 (α2 + 2ω (1 + βJ)), (12)
4If initial conditions yt′0−J , yt′0−J+1, yt′0−J+2, . . . , yt′0−1 all equal zero, the optimal commit-
ment plan from t0 would implement the exact same conditions as the optimal plan from t
′
0,
and cannot be improved upon. However, given the stochastic shock ut, this is highly unlikely,
especially for large J .
5This exploits that Et0
∑∞
t=t′0
βt−t
′
0(pi2t + ωy
2
t ) = E
∑∞
t=t′0
βt−t
′
0(pi2t + ωy
2
t ) for large enough
t′0 − t0. Due to certainty equivalence, the optimal discretionary and commitment policies with
respect to the unconditional objective (7) are the same as with the conditional one (6).
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Figure 1: Old commitment plan vs. discretion, Lc = Ld.
assuming a persistent shock
ut = ρut−1 + at (13)
where at is white noise with variance σ
2 and ρ ∈ (0, 1). When the optimal
discretionary policy (4) is implemented in all periods t = t′0, t
′
0 + 1, t
′
0 + 2, . . . , its
value is
Ld =
ω (ω + α2) s
(ω (1− βJρJ) + α2)2 . (14)
Assuming β = .99 and ρ = .9, figure 1 plots iso-loss curves for different values
of J , that is, combinations of α and ω for which Ld = Lc, so that the expected loss
(7) is the same for optimal discretion and any optimal commitment plan that is
at least J periods old.6 For each of the curves, and corresponding value of J , the
6The values β = .99 and ρ = .9 are standard in the New-Keynesian sticky-price litera-
ture of the monetary policy problem, which is identical to our model when J = 1 (see next
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optimal commitment plan from t0 does better than discretion for combinations of
α and ω above the curve, and worse than discretion for parameter combinations
below the curve. As is evident from the figure, it is possible for discretion to do
better, on average, than the optimal plan from t0. In particular, this is more
prone to occurring, the larger J is. The reason is, as discussed above, that
from the perspective of the period-t′0 objective (6), the commitment plan from
t0 implements a suboptimal equation in the first J periods, implementing the
optimal one after that, while discretion implements the optimal equation in the
first J periods, implementing a suboptimal one afterwards. Hence, the larger
J is, the greater the advantage of discretion over the optimal commitment plan
from t0, and the larger the set of parameter values for which it dominates.
7
The assumed trigger strategy requires that the discretionary solution (4) per-
tain in all periods following a deviation from previous commitments. Conse-
quently, if policymakers deviate from the optimal t0-plan in any later period t
′
0,
the policy objective (6) would on average take the value Ld from then on. If
instead they remain truthful to the optimal t0-plan, the policy objective would
on average take the value Lc. Looking forward, predicting whether policymakers
will want to deviate from the once-and-for-all commitment to the optimal t0-plan
section). Lowering β rotates the curves up around their intercept on the α-axis, making the
area where discretion dominates larger. Raising β has the opposite effect, as does lowering
ρ. The standard deviation σ has no impact on Lc/Ld, or the figure. Estimates of α and
ω for the monetary policy model vary across studies and countries, with α ∈ (.001, .37) and
ω ∈ (.001, 31.37), see Assenmacher-Wesche (2006), Dennis (2004), Givens (2012), Schorfheide
(2008), and So¨derstro¨m, So¨derlind and Vredin (2005). Most studies find parameter values to-
wards the lower ends. While these values are not necessarily relevant for J 6= 1, or outside the
New-Keynesian model, we use these as a benchmark throughout.
7A similar figure can be computed comparing the two policies from the perspective
of the conditional objective (6). It would be sensitive to the assumed initial conditions
yt′0−J , yt′0−J+1, yt′0−J+2, . . . , yt′0−1 and ut′0 , but unless these are all zero, it remains true that
raising J increases the set of parameter values for which discretion dominates.
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in any later period t′0 far enough into the future (so that the unconditional ob-
jective becomes relevant), depends on Ld and Lc. If Ld < Lc, policymakers will
eventually want to deviate from the optimal t0-plan because it would eventually
do worse, on average, than discretion, from the perspective of expected future
policy objectives (6). The fact that the t0-plan did better than discretion orig-
inally, would be irrelevant, as bygones are bygones. If Ld > Lc, policymakers
might not want to deviate from the optimal t0-plan, as it does better, on aver-
age, than the only viable alternative, the discretionary equilibrium. Moreover,
the implicit threat of ending up at the inferior discretionary equilibrium might
act as a deterrent to deviating. However, Ld > Lc is insufficient to guarantee
that policymakers would not deviate from the original optimal plan, since there
can be additional gains from an unanticipated deviation. If large enough, these
gains might more than compensate for any expected future gains from remaining
faithful to the original optimal plan, especially for impatient policymakers.
Contrary to Taylor (1979a), Woodford (1999, 2003) and Jensen and McCal-
lum (2010), we are not suggesting that policymakers should ignore present initial
conditions when evaluating different policies. Also, our point is not that once
outdated, the original optimal plan can do worse than discretion from an un-
conditional point of view, but that looking forward, it would be expected to
eventually do worse, on average, in terms of the original conditional objective.
Since bygones are bygones, policymakers would then want to deviate from the
original plan, despite knowing that they would never be able to commit again
(due to the assumed trigger strategy). That is, they would from then on prefer
the discretionary equilibrium in all future periods rather than maintaining a cred-
ible commitment to the original plan, even ignoring any short-term gains from a
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surprise deviation. Hence, they would not deviate in an attempt to commit to
the new optimal plan, which is by assumption unfeasible, but rather to settle on
the discretionary equilibrium.
3 Contemporary model
The New-Keynesian sticky-price model of the inflation-output trade-off is exten-
sively used to study monetary policy. In its simplest version, it is identical to
the model above when J = 1, pit denotes inflation and yt is output, both mea-
sured in terms of period-t deviations from their respective flexible-price values.
The variable ut is a cost-push shock. The policy objective (1) is derived as a
quadratic approximation to a representative household’s expected life-time util-
ity in period t0, so in each period, policymakers seek to maximize the discounted
sum of households’ present and expected future utility. The parameters α and ω
depend on the degree of price-stickiness, while β is a discount factor.8
Since J = 1, continuing the optimal plan from any previous period t0 in
any later period t′0 > t0 only deviates from the optimal t
′
0-plan in terms of the
action implemented in t′0, equation (5) instead of (4). The impact this has on
the t′0 policy objective (6) depends on the conditions that happen to prevail at
the time (Dennis (2001, 2010)). When yt′0−1 = 0, the optimal plan from any
previous period is identical to that from t′0, and cannot be improved upon. The
more yt′0−1 differs from zero, the more the implemented action (5) differs from the
8See for example Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), King and Wolman (1999), Svensson and
Woodford (2002, 2005) and Woodford (2000, 2003). For details on the derivation of the model
see also Calvo (1983), Rotemberg (1982), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford
(2003). In line with much of the literature, we ignore a motive for interest-rate smoothing to
simplify the analysis.
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optimal one (4), and the less desirable the objective value (6) becomes. The dis-
cretionary solution only matches the optimal t′0-plan in terms of the initial-period
action, differing in all later periods. Hence, from the perspective of any period
t′0, whether the discretionary solution does better or worse than any optimal plan
from the past, depends on the initial condition yt′0−1. As initial conditions vary
over time, whether discretion or the outdated plan is preferable, will also vary.
But, integrating over these initial conditions, as above, figure 1 shows that even
in this case (J = 1), discretion can, on average, do better than an outdated opti-
mal commitment plan, despite doing worse for most parameter values.9 It is just
that when J = 1, the expectational dynamics are so simple that it is difficult for
discretion to outdo the outdated optimal plan, since the latter only differs from
the updated optimal plan in the initial period.
4 More general models
The simple expectational dynamics in current and past policy models, exempli-
fied in the previous section, favor a credible once-and-for-all commitment over
discretion. However, there are examples, beyond the stylized one in the second
section, of relevant models that are less favorable to commitment. Replacing the
constraint above (2) with
pit =
J∑
j=1
βjEtpit+j + αyt + ut, (15)
9That equation (5) can yield a lower unconditionally expected loss (7) than discretion (4)
when J = 1 was first discussed by Blake (2001) and Jensen (2001).
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yields a model with more complicated, and maybe more realistic, expectational
dynamics, where expectations about policy in all J future periods are relevant, in-
stead of just in one particular future period. Keeping the objective (1) unchanged,
the optimal commitment plan from the perspective of period t0 becomes
pit0 = −
ω
α
yt0 (16)
pit0+1 = −
ω
α
yt0+1 +
ω
α
yt0 (17)
pit0+2 = −
ω
α
yt0+2 +
ω
α
yt0+1 +
ω
α
yt0 (18)
...
pit = −ω
α
yt +
ω
α
yt−1 +
ω
α
yt−2 + · · ·+ ω
α
yt−J (19)
where the latter equation (19) applies for t = t0 + J, t0 + J + 1, t0 + J + 2, . . . In
this case, the optimal plan prescribes a different policy equation for each of the
initial J periods, so continuing the optimal plan from any earlier time implements
a suboptimal equation in the first J periods. The discretionary solution matches
the currently optimal plan only in the initial period. Which does better, the old
plan or discretion, again depends on how outdated the old plan is, the conditions
that happen to prevail at the time, and the parameter values, in particular J .
However, these more complicated expectational dynamics illustrate more clearly
how the optimal plan from a previous period fails to shape expectations of future
policy optimally from the perspective of the present period, thus making it more
prone to doing worse than discretion, which makes no attempt at influencing
expectations.
The relevance of this more complicated type of expectational dynamics in
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policy problems has been suggested in the literature, at least for monetary policy,
arising with alternative models of price-setting, for example with multi-period
Taylor (1979b) contracts, or for Calvo-pricing with time-varying trend inflation
(Sbordone (2007)). Another example is the sticky-information model (Mankiw
and Reis (2002)), where the Phillips curve constraint is
pit =
J∑
j=1
bjEt−j(pit + cyt) + ayt + ut (20)
with strictly positive b1, b2, . . . , bJ , c and a, where J is a strictly positive inte-
ger denoting the maximum number of periods producers go without updating
their information sets. While the timing of the policy expectations differ, Et−jpit
instead of Etpit+j, the commitment solutions are similar in that the optimal t0-
plan implements discretion in t0, but proposes gradually more complicated policy
equations for t0 + 1 through t0 + J , as it takes into account the effects policy ex-
pectations have on the t0-policy objective (1), which are more complex the longer
ahead the policy is known (up to J).
5 Conclusions
Optimal plans are time-inconsistent, so continuing the one from a previous pe-
riod is not optimal from today’s perspective, and can do worse, we show, in terms
of achieving policymakers’ contemporary objectives, than the discretionary equi-
librium. Thinking ahead, policymakers might therefore not wish to irreversibly
commit to the optimal plan from any given period, even if they could, but in-
stead decide policy period-by-period in a discretionary manner. Hence, we find
17
that whether or not a binding commitment is desirable, depends on the policy
problem at hand. In particular, it depends on how complicated the expectational
dynamics are, especially how long it takes for the optimal plan to settle on a
particular policy action, but can even vary with the parameter values.
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